Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2004

Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another's Language? Eldred
and the Duration of Copyright
Wendy J. Gordon
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wendy J. Gordon, Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another's Language? Eldred and the Duration of
Copyright , in Copyright and Human Rights 109 (Paul L. C. Torremans ed., 2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1926

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open
access by Scholarly Commons at Boston University
School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
For more information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

Boston University
OpenBU

http://open.bu.edu

School of Law

LAW: Scholarly Papers

2004-06-17

Do we have a right to speak with
another's language? Eldred and the
duration of copyright
Wendy J. Gordon, Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another's Language? Eldred
and the Duration of Copyright, in Copyright and Human Rights 109 (Paul L.C.
Torremans, ed., Kluwer Law International 2004). Archived in OpenBU at [uri].
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/22974
Boston University

Chapter 6
Do We have a Right to Speak with
Another's Language? Eldred and the
Duration of Copyright
Wendy J. Gordon*
I.

Free Speech

The law embodies two contradictory sets of rights and interests pertaining to
copyright and speech. On the one hand. stand authors' claims to deserve
compensation and control over their works. On the other hand stand the public's
claims to be free to build on and deploy the cultural works that pervade daily life.
The conflict is reflected in apparently-contradictory provisions within the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 27(2) provides that 'Everyone has
the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author'. That Article
seems to support copyrights, patents, and other exclusive rights in intellectual
~roducts. Yet Article 27( I) states that 'Everyone has the right freely to participate
m the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits'. An ability to participate fully sometimes requires
the use of works authored by others. I Conceptually related to Article 27( 1) are the
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prov1s10ns of Article 19. That Article states that "Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression' including 'freedom ... to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers'.
In the United States, the law reflects a similar tension. Copyright law gives
authors rights to control how their expression is used, and the First Amendment to
the federal Constitution provides that ·congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press'. Freedom of speech is hard to square with
exclusive rights.
Admittedly. copyright law does not embed direct governmental censorship.
Nevertheless, it can embed privately-motivated censorship 2 which government
then enforces. Such restraints at government hands can be inconsistent with the
public's ability to participate in its culture. 3 Copyright can be squared with the
public's rights of participation and expression only if it is sharply limited in scope
and duration.
Yet copyright continually grows. Following the European Union's expansion
of copyright term to 'life of the author plus seventy years', the United States
followed suit with the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (the 'CTEA '). 4 In
Eldred 1'. Ashcroft, 5 a legal action was brought to challenge the CTEA on the

('()/I/.

4

Bill of Rights'. in William & Marr Lmv Rel'ie1r 33 (1992) 665: Y. Benkler, "Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraint on Enclosure of the Public Domain', in Ne1r York
U11i1·ersity Lm1· Rel'ie1r 74 (1999) 354: C.E. Baker. "First Amendment Limits on Copyright'. in
Va11dcrhil1 Law Rnie1r 55 (2002) 891.
W.J. Gordon, "Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem
of Private Censorship', in C11ircrsi1_r o(Chicago Lair Rniell' 57 (review essay. 1990) 1009, 103247.
W.J. Gordon. "A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property'. in Yale Lall' Journal 102 ( 1993) 1533 at 1607 & note 400 (arguing
that enforcement of intellectual property rights should be acknowledged as governmental action
subject to Constitutional limitation.).
That Act actually went further than the European directive with which it sought harmonization.
for the US act extended to 95 years the duration of works made for hire. As Justice Breyer
noted. "Despite appearances. the statute does 1101 create a uniform American-European term
with respect to the lion's share of the economically significant works that it affects - all works
made 'for hire' and all existing works created prior to 1978. With respect to those works the
American statute produces an extended term of 95 years while comparable European rights in
"for hire· works last for periods that vary from 50 years to 70 years to life plus 70 years.
Compare 17 U .S.C.§ § 302(c). 304(a)-(b) with Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993
Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights. Articles 1-3.
( 1993) 0. 1· L 290 (hereinafter EU Council Directive 93/98). Neither does the statute create
uniformity with respect to anonymous or pseudonymous works. Compare 17 U .S.C.§ § 302(c).
304(a}-(b) with EU Council Directive 93198. Article l. Eldred 1., Ashcroji. U.S., 123 S.Ct.769
(2003). at 285 (Breyer. J., dissenting).
Eldred\'. Ashcrofi. 537 U.S. 186. 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). rehearing denied, 123 S. Ct. 1505 (Mem.
2003).
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ground that it conflicted with the US Constitution. One ground urged for
unconstitutionality depended on the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
The challenge was rejected, and the CTEA upheld. Nevertheless, the portent of
Eldred for free speech in the United States is not all bad.
One could not have predicted as much from the lower court opinions in the
matter. The District Court (trial court level) brushed off the First Amendment
challenge as if it were trivial. Wrote that court: '[T]here are no First Amendment
rights to use the copyrighted works of others'. 6 The intermediate appellate court
affirmed, stating that ·copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under
the First Amendmenf. 7
When the matter came to the United States Supreme Court, however,
acknowledgement came: sometimes each of us does have a right to use the
copyrighted works of others. 8 even if that right is 'second-class'. 9 Copyright itself
has to be formed and interpreted to safeguard the public's rights of free speech. 10
In the United States. the Court wrote, at least two doctrines provide that
safeguard. The first is the so-called 'dichotomy' between expression (which can be
owned) and ideas (which cannot).'' The second is the doctrine that treats some
uses of copyrighted works as ·fair' and non-infringing. 12 Given those two
doctrines, the Court upheld the CTEA.

6

Id., 537 U.S. 186 (quoting from the opinion of the District Court. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.Supp.2d
1 (D.D.C.1999) at 3.)
Eldred v Reno. 239 F.3d 372 at 376 (D.C. Circuit 2001 ).
8
Wrote the Supreme Court. ·we recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it
declared copyrights "categorically im1~une from challenges under the First Amendment"", 537
U.S. at 789- 790.
9
D. McGowan. 'Why the first Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy', in Ohio State
Law Journal (forthcoming, 2004). McGowan is pointing to the Court's caveat: 'The First
Amendment ... bears Ie;s heavilv when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches', 537 US at 789-90.
10
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One applauds the Supreme Court's recogmt10n that the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use are constitutionally mandated. At the same time,
one can certainly disagree with the Court's assessment that with these doctrines in
place, copyright poses no danger to free expression. Both fair use and the idea/
expression dichotomy are notoriously unpredictable, and creative experimentation
can be chilled by uncertainty as to liability. Moreover, to imagine that idea/
expression dichotomy can accommodate a wide range of expressive concerns is to
overstate its capacity: creative artists who need to use predecessor's work have
sharply questioned 'copyright's notion that ideas and facts are anterior to their
particular expressions' . 13 Ideas and facts are not inevitably 'separable, yielding to
paraphrase, transmissible without either disfigurement or infringement' . 14
Therefore, even if the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine are
expanded, the long duration of copyright remains a danger to the public's
participation in its culture. The long copyright term also poses a danger to
copyright's ability to serve the public's welfare interests, for a grant far in the
future gives an author little incentive (remember that the author decides whether
or not to write today).This should be compared with the significant costs that the
far-future grant can impose on audiences and second authors (who will continue
to decide whether or not to purchase or adapt a work in thefiaure). Yet the Eldred
court refused to admit the danger posed.
Perhaps an accommodation can be reached from the other side: Perhaps the
author has no justifiable claims of right that would grant her a copyright that
extended into the life of her great-grandchildren.
In what follows, I employ both instrumentalist welfare norms and norms of
moral right to explore whether a life-plus seventy copyright term makes sense. I
begin with illustrating the welfare loss.

II.

The Naturally Circumscribed Rights of the Author, and the
Public's Welfare Interest

Let me begin by making things more concrete. What does it mean to have a
copyright duration of life plus seventy? It is hard for us to project into the future,
since so many of its changes are unimaginable now. So instead, let us project into
the past.
Imagine that the 'life plus seventy' rule had been enacted at the turn of the last
century, and turn your mind's eye to a talented, fictional somebody born in 1900.
Imagine that this individual immigrates to the United States a child, learns an

13

Paul Saim-Amour, The Copnrrigh1s: lnlellec/ua/ Properly and the Li!erary Imagination. Cornell
University Press (2003). at 189 (discussing James Joyce·s view of copyright law. as expressed in
~~).

14

!hid.
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immense amount growing up in New York City, comes to maturity, and becomes
a songwriter and lyricist. Her many brilliant songs during the Roaring Twenties
are said to capture the spirit and age of the City. Let us now say that in 1931, at the
age of thirty-one, she writes something that captures the transition between the
period of prosperity she had long celebrated, and the economic anxiety that
followed the 1929 Wall Street crash. The song is played everywhere, and every
artist wants his or her voice to be heard singing this particular song. This vogue
goes on for a few years, but, as with most popular music, after a while the song
stops being so popular.
However, for the long copyright term to have any impact, the song would need
to become the kind of classic whose market never dries up completely. So let us
assume this is the case. The song has become a 'standard'. Recordings continue to
sell, bands continue to 'cover' the song, and the song continues to reside in the
public imagination. Anyone hearing even a few bars of the tune will recognize it.
And let us assume that the song has an influence in the music community. As with
literature and the visual arts, individual pieces of music can significantly alter the
course of the art form, and so it is with our musical work.
So, an individual who arrived in New York near the start of the last century,
and lived the immigrant New York experience that so many of our families shared,
forged a great piece of music, which was released in 1931 and remains of interest
years later. Imagine, now, that this individual dies at the age of seventy in 1970.
She leaves middle-aged sons and daughters, along with grandchildren in their
twenties.
Under a life plus seventy rule, the copyright of that piece of 1931 music would
not expire until the year 2040.15 At that point, the composer's grandchildren
would be in their nineties, if they were alive at all, and those grandchildren would
have adult grandchildren and great-grandchildren of their own. Therefore, a
cultural and musical fixture, which was created under a series of influences from
the very early twentieth century, and which in turn influenced the growth and
development of the twentieth century, will have copyright protection through a
good part of the twenty-first.
During the last twenty years or so of that term - an amount equal to what is
added by the Bono extension - it is likely that the composer will have personally
known none of the surviving royalty recipients. Yet, should a new composer want

15

The example in the text simplifies by imagining that something like the Bono Act _had been
applicable at the time the 1931 song was created. Under the actual Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act. 'life plus seventy" o~ly applies to works created on or after January I. 1978. S~e
17 U.S.C. § 302(a). There arc special rules for works for hire and some other works. see id.§§
302(b)-(c), and the Act also gives special treatment to works that were created earher than 1978.
See id. § 303. Thus. for wo;ks are already in their renewal terms when the Bono Act became
effective, the copyright term is ·95 years from the date copyright was originally secured'. Id. S
304(b).
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to adapt the famous song to reflect on a twenty-first-century period of financial
tumult and transition. the new composer could not do so without permission from
at least one of those copyright owners. Similarly, someone who in 2031 wants to
make a multi-media CD-ROM showing the history of mid-twentieth-century
music could not include this and other music from the period without seeking
permission from remote holders of copyrights all over the world. Some of the
people who hold the copyrights in these century-old songs will no longer be
identifiable through ordinary methods of search. The CTEA makes us face the
question of whether all this is a good idea.

III. Illustrating the Welfare Loss
There are two aspects of importance in understanding the welfare loss:
discounting, and the effect of a unitary copyright term on disparate works.
Ill. I. DISCOUNTING

The notion that we 'discount' benefits we will receive far in the future is a familiar
one. Thus, Lord Macaulay used the notion when in the nineteenth century he
opposed a particular copyright extension. 'For the sake of the good we must
submit to the evil'. argued Lord Macaulay of copyright, 'But the evil ought not to
last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good'. 16 What is
'necessary' must be judged from the perspective of what is necessary to induce the
lazy author to get up earlier in the morning to work. Will he be so encouraged
because he expects a far-distant advantage might accrue to his heirs? Macaulay
thought not:
·we all know how faintly we are affected by the prospect of very distant
advantages. even when they are advantages which we may reasonably hope
that we shall ourselves enjoy. But an advantage that is to be enjoyed more
than half a century after we are dead, by somebody, we know not by whom.
perhaps by somebody unborn, by somebody utterly unconnected with us, is
really no motive at all to action'.17
It is equally hard to imagine that a long copyright term would add a significant
amount to the sum a publisher will offer today for an assignment of the copyright.
Consider the following example.
Let us imagine an author who anticipates that a writing of hers would bring

16

17

T Macaulay. Speech Before the House of Commons ( Feh. 5, 1841). in Lady Trevelyan (ed.). The
Works of Lord Macaulay 8 (1906) 203-204 [hereinafter Macaulay Speech of 1841], available at

http:jiwww.kuro5hin.org;story/2002/4/25/ 1345/03329.
!hid. at 200.
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$1,000 in gross revenue every year from the moment of creation until copyright
ends (this assumption is very generous to supporters of the CTEA for ordinarily
revenues are extremely hard to predict. and strongly decrease over time as works
fall out of fashion). Assume the author is sixty in 2002, and that actuarial tables
tell her she can expect to live another twenty-five years, to 2027. 18 If in 2002 she
were deciding whether to write this new book, under the pre-CTEA copyright law
she would expect her copyrights to expire in 2077. Assuming a five percent rate of
interest and no inflation. the present value of seventy-five years of receiving $1,000
yearly would be $19,490. 19 Under a pre-CTEA copyright term, a publisher would
therefore anticipate receiving up to $19,490 from the new work she contemplates.
Of course, in offering to buy the copyright, the publisher would offer the author
less than that, to cover risk. publishing and distribution costs, and the publisher's
own profit share. Let us say the publisher would offer half, or $9,745.
Now let us examine what happens under the CTEA 's grant of an additional
twenty years. What is the present value of the additional income stream, assuming
that $ l,000 continued to be earned every year between 2077 and 2097? It is $320,
raising the 2002 present value from $19,490 to $19,810. 20 It is thus possible that
with a long term, a publisher will anticipate receiving $320 more. If the publisher
offers half of that to the author. the resulting increase in authorial incentive is
$160. That is a very small sum indeed compared to the whole. It is likely to have
small or zero marginal incentive effect, an effect which (even if it exists) is gained
at the disproportionate expense of the public. 21

18

The example in text is premised on a sixty-year-old author. A younger author would anticipate
having a longer term. This ·Jife plus· structure of the law is potentially counterproductive: as
Macaulay argued a term hingina on the life of the author gives the longest period of legal
protection to-·juv~nile" works.
the shortest period to ·mature· works. Yet works ·written in
maturity' tend to be more valuable. If it is thought necessary to give more incentive. terms
should be defined by a certain term. rather than by a 'life plus' formula. See Thomas Macaulay
Speech Bej(Jre the House of Com111011s (Apr. 6. 1842). in Lady Trevelyan (ed.). The Works of
Lord Macaular 8 (1906) 2IO-I6. Also available at the website identified in footnote 16.
Affidavit of H.al R. Varian paragraph 5-9. Eldred r.Reno. 239 F.3d 372 (D.C.Cir. 2001) (No.995430) [hereinafter Varian Affidavit]. available at http:/;cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/
varian. pdf.
See Varian Affidavit at paragraph 5-9. Eldred (No.99-5430) .
See Stan Liebowitz. infi·a. at figure 2 and accompanying explanation. Thomas Macaulay
argued that "[a] monopoly of sixt~ years produces twice as much evil as a monopoly of thirty
years. and thrice as much nil as a monopoly of twenty years'. Macaulay Speech of 1841. supra.
note 16, at 200. This is mathematicallv correct if by 'evil" he meant the costs to the public
without regard to the offsetting benefit~ that copyright also brings. Taking both into account.
however. Macaulav underestimated. The offsetting benefits are higher. and the costs lower. 111
the first years of a -monopoly than in its later years. The dead weight loss caused by increases m
monopoly duration grows at a far faster rate than the incentive effect does. _See Stan Liebowitz
and my discussion of his thesis in/i"a Part IV. A monopoly of sixty years imposes more than_
twice as much dcadweight loss (exclusive of the impact of discounting) as does a monopoly ot
thirty years.

:md

19

20

,
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111.2. EFFECT OF UNITARY TERM ON DISPARATE WORKS
As Stanley Liebowitz has shown, the cost of monopoly increases at a far faster rate
than the incentive effect does. 22 This is not just because of the familiar discounting
arguments. The following takes into account the loss attributable to unnecessary
copyright protection in a way that should make it easy to see the costs of long
copyright terms.
Let us backtrack to basics. Different creative works require different incentives.
Some works would have come into being without any copyright at all; some would
have come into being with a promise of five years of copyright protection; some
would have come into being with a promise of ten years of protection; and so on.
Only when a work would have come into existence without the need of a particular
monopoly provision, should that provision be counted as generating a deadweight
loss. This applies to provisions about duration as well. Every year that copyright
lasts, more and more works fall into the category of works that did not need a
copyright term this long to be produced. Every year of added duration brings
additions to the group of works as to which copyright generates deadweight loss, 23
and subtractions from the group as to which copyright provides a social benefit.
Consider, for example, a copyright duration of five years. Assume there is a
work for which the author needed the full five-year term to be induced to produce
the work. Let us assume the work in question is an interpretive translation of
Bemru(f 4 called Beoll'u(( Transmuted. For Beowulf Transmuted, a five-year
copyright term generates no loss: if the book is valuable, its value is a gain
attributable to that five-year copyright. 25 However high in price and small in
quantity the copies of BemrnllTransmutedmight be, they are a pure gain compared
to an alternative state of shorter copyright in which this version of Beowulf did not
exist. This is not true as to works that would have come into being with a term of
less than five years: for a work that needed only three years of copyright to come
into being, a five-year term generates two years of deadweight loss.
What happens in year six? We are dealing with a book, Bemrnl( Transmuted.
whose author would have written it so long as she anticipated copyright protection
would last five years. If copyright ended at five years, in year six the book would
be in existence, and could be reproduced and sold competitively. Per-copy price
would go down and the quantity in circulation would rise.

"
23

24
25

See Stan Liebowitz. supra. note 21, at Figure 2 and accompanying explanation.
!hid. In this and succeeding paragraphs of the instant section, my analysis is heavily indebted to
that of Stan Liebowitz.
Michael Alexander (ed.). Beoiru/J: Penguin Books ( 1995).
The work's existence is also attributable to many other contributing causes, such as the
translator's efforts, dictionaries she may have employed. and. of course, the sources of the first
Bemrnl{ When I speak of the work's being 'attributable to' copyright, I mean only that
copyright is one of its many causes-in-fact.

116

Do WE

HAVE A RIGHT TO SPEAK WITH ANOTHER'S LANGUAGE?

By contrast, if copyright continued in the sixth year, the book would be sold at
a higher price to fewer people. Under copyright. it would thus generate less benefit
than it could in the absence of copyright. The decrease is 'deadweight loss'
attributable to the extra year of protection. In assessing the value of a sixth year of
copyright, then, an economist would put Beowulf Transmuted into the category of
works for which copyright generates a loss - although for the fifth year of the
copyright's duration, the book had belonged in the category of works for which
copyright generated a social benefit. 26
Every year, more and more works make the transition from the plus to the
minus category. The same book for which copyright generated no deadweight loss
in year Y (because its author needed as incentive a copyright whose term
continued through that year). may generate deadweight loss the next year. When
the Court upheld the term of 'life plus seventy', every book and film that would
have come into existence even without the extra twenty years fell into the category
of contributing to deadweight loss.
Ill.2.1.

A GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS MAY HELP TO ILLUSTRATE

The expectation that authors will discount to present value is a common-sense part
of the explanation of why copyright terms should be limited rather than perpetual.
Interestingly, however, a long copyright term can produce a net loss for society
even if authors are indifferent as between immediate and future rewards.
Economist Stan Liebowitz has developed a fascinating illustration to this effect.
He shows that under some assumptions, copyright could produce a net social loss
even if authors did not respond less favourably to distant rewards than to
immediate ones. 27 In the illustration. all works are assumed to last for ten years.
Without copyright. the value of a work to society is assumed to be $JOO per year.
Under copyright. since the price is higher and fewer copies are disseminated, the
value of the work to society is assumed to be $60 per year. Assume that without
copyright JOO copies will be produced. The copyright term can be from zero to ten
years long, and for every year of copyright that the law promises, authors are
assumed to respond by bringing forth six additional works.
Although the assumptions are quite constraining, most of us will nevertheless
be surprised by the result: fess value is generated under a nine or ten year copyright
term than under no copyright at all. On the following graphs. the duration of t~e
copyright term is measured (in years) on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis
measures the monetary value of the works created under each designated

26

,

-7

·
·
See the mathematical example and charts. supra. note 18. for an 1llustrat10n
o f t he mechanism ·
E·mall· lrom
·
· EconomICs.
· u111vers1
· ·t Y of Texas. at Dallas
Stan Liebowitz. Professor of Managenal
. .
(Autumn 2002) (on file with author). Incidentally. although I make use of Professor Liebowitz 5
illustration with his permission. I subject it to uses of my own, and responsibility for any errors
rest with me.
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Monetary Value of Works Produced Under
Differing Durations
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copyright term. The first chart measures the gross output of works: the value of
works under no copyright, and the value of works under copyright terms of from
one to ten years. The second chart shows how these various copyrights compare
with a regime of no copyright at all. In a sense, the second chart measures the
monetary value, under the assumed facts, of the various copyright systems.
The following examples will illustrate the method of calculation. Note that
discounting plays no role, nor are administrative costs of the copyright system
included.
Under no copyright: With zero copyright, 100 works are produced which are
worth $100 yearly and last ten years. Their value over the ten years (without
discounting) is thus $100,000.
- Under a regime giving one year of copyright protection: With one year of
-
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copyright, six more works are produced, totalling 106 works. The first year
of these works' existence is under copyright, so each generates $60 in value
($6,360 for all). The next nine years they are in the public domain, so,
without discounting, over that period each of the 106 generate $900 ($95,400
for all). Summing the value during the ten years that the works last, the 106
works have a value of$101,760 (this appears on the first chart above). This is
an increase of $1,760 over a system of no copyright (this figure appears on
the second chart).
- Under a regime giving nine years of copyright protection: With nine years of
copyright protection promised, authors produce (9 x 6) or fifty-four more
works than they would without copyright. Under a nine-year term,
therefore, 154 works would be in existence. For each of the nine years
under copyright, they generate $60 each, for a total of $83, 160. In their last
year, the 154 generate $100 of value each, or $15,400 for all. The total value
of the works produced under a regime of nine years of copyright protection
is $98,560. The copyright system now has produced a loss as compared with
a system of no copyright.
- With a ten-year term, the loss grows larger. Under a ten-year term, 160
works would be in existence and would yield a total value of $96,000 - a loss
of $4,000 in comparison with the $100,000 generated with no copyright at
all.
What drives the social loss in the illustration is copyright's unitary term. CTEA
proponents are not alone in assuming that extending a copyright term will
sometimes bring forth more works. Such an assumption necessarily implies that
different works or classes of works (novels versus movies, perhaps) respond to
different incentives. A unitary term by definition is unable to respond to different
works' needs with varying periods of protection. In a world where different works
respond to different terms, a unitary term will therefore generate deadweight loss.

IV. Perspectives from Policy and Rights
My role in this section is not to talk about the constitutionality of the CTEA.
Rather, I am going to look at the statute through the lens of two kinds of policies.
One set of policies might be grouped under the title, 'authors' rights'. The other set
might be called 'instrumentalist'. They provide two quite different evaluative
perspectives.
The authors' rights advocate usually views copyright as resting on some
characteristic tie between the author and her work, which justifies giving
ownership to the author, regardless of its societal effects. Thus, authors' rights
approaches focus on the individual producer, and tend to look backwards: A work
has been produced - now how should the law treat it'? The answer of the authors'
rights advocate typically is that the creator of the work deserves ownership in it.
By contrast. an instrumentalist policy focuses on economic incentives or other
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societal effects of granting copyright. Instrumentalism is concerned with the
producer, too, but views her as one person among many who may be affected by a
change in law. Instrumentalism looks forward, rather than back. Its proponents
ask: How best can the law encourage authors to produce new work in the future,
and do so in such a way that the value of new works so induced exceeds the costs
of the system?28 The answer to that question is not always ownership.
The US Constitution empowers the federal legislature to grant copyrights and
patents in a Clause that is instrumentalist in wording. Congress is given its power
'to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts' .29 Yet, when James
Madison defended the Clause in the Federalist Papers, he did so on the grounds
that granting copyrights and patents was one of the few places where the public
interest coincided with private claims of right. 30 This convergence of private and
public perspectives - analogous to authors' rights and instrumentalism - occurs
often. Our law tends to be most stable and least contested when such convergence
occurs.
One area where the two kinds of policies would likely converge is in the giving
of copyright in the first instance. 31 To extend the term of copyright from zero years
to ten years, for instance, would greatly increase the incentives of authors, and
simultaneously honour their ties to their work. And the resulting incentives would
outweigh the monopoly restraints on access that copyright also brings. Therefore,
both perspectives would give a 'thumbs up' if the question were increasing a
copyright term from zero years to ten. Increasing the term of copyright from ten
years to, let's say, thirty years or fifty years might also gain support from
instrumentalists, as well as authors' rights advocates.
But when the question instead is extending copyright from life-of-the-author
plus fifty to life-of-the-author plus seventy, one would think that the authors'
rights and instrumentalist approaches might pull away from each other. A simple
view of authors' rights seems to say: All Power to the Poet - increase the copyright
term as much as you can. By contrast, an instrumentalist is likely to doubt that
incentives will be significantly enhanced by the extra twenty years of copyright
term. It provides twenty more years of making works expensive and difficult to
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See S. Liebowitz. 'Copyright Law. Photocopying and Price Discrimination". in R. Zerbe (ed.),
Research in Lm1· and Economics 8 (1986) 181-200 (exploring the trade-off between duration.
incentives. and monopoly restraints).
29
US Constitution Article I, § 8, clause 8.
"' 'The public good'. he wrote, 'fully coincides ... with the claims of individuals'. J. Madison, 'The
Federalist No. 43', in J.E. Cooke (ed.). The Federalist. Wesleyan University Press ( 1961). at 309
[hereinafter Madison]. Let us leave outside our scope whether Madison was correct in thinking
that the common law would have given authors valid claims to control the copying of their
published work.
·'

1

See W.J. Gordon, 'An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency.
Consent and Encouragement Theory', in Stanford Lmr Revieir 41 ( 1989) 1343, 1365-1366.
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access, without giving a compensating gain in incentives. 32 As Lord Macaulay said
of a piece of legislation that would have increased copyright term to a length less
than that granted by the Bono Act, 'it leaves the advantages nearly what they are
at present, and increases the disadvantages at least four fold'. 33 Someone who
believes the goal of law is the instrumental one of being 'beneficial for mankind'34
is thus highly unlikely to favour the extension.
So one would hardly expect convergence here. One might assume that persons
flying an authors' rights flag would favour the Bono extension of copyright term,
while those wearing instrumentalist colours would oppose it.
The theory of the various instrumentalist positions - at least those classified as
economic or utilitarian - are fairly well understood. Still needed, however, is a
deeper understanding of the authors' rights claim. Too often, such claims are
presented as a sort of unreasoned impulse that leaves the important questions
unanswered.
For example, we might all agree it is laudable to 'reward authors'. But how
much reward is appropriate? For another example, some authors' rights advocates
speak of 'giving every cow its calf. But unlike calves and kids, a new intangible
can have many mothers and look like none of them. So how should the cow-calf
relationship be defined? Or sometimes authors' rights advocates take refuge in the
notion that 'reaping without sowing' is an evil that should be prohibited. 35 But to
oppose 'reaping without sowing' is profoundly antisocial. From Ben Kaplan 36
·and John Dawson37 back through time, students of society have realized that we
all obtain benefits that we did not earn, simply by being born into human society.
To learn is to reap more than we sow.38 If we could not use the tools that make up
our culture without the permission of the descendants of whoever initially created
that culture. many bad results would follow. One result, I think, is that we would
end up with a feeling that we do not really belong to the same community, which
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See Stan Liebowitz. supra. note 28.
Macaulay, supra. note 16. at 733.
!hid. at 732. The law of England at the time of Macaulay's speech gave copyright for the
duration of the author's life ~r twenty-eight years. whichever was longer. The bill he opposed
would have extended copyright to life of the author and sixty years. See ihid. at 731. Macaulay
himself apparently favoured copyright for life. or forty-two years, whichever was longer.
The most famous American case prohibiting reaping without sowing appears in lntemational
Ne\fs SerriCl' v. Associated Press. 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (upholding a right to sue for
misappropriation of news). For a fuller discussion, using restitution law as an analogy to limit
'reap and sow' claims. sec W.J. Gordon. ·on Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse·. in J ·;,.~i11ia Lml' R<'l'ie1I' 78 ( 1992) 149. 149-166. 178-180.
See B. Kaplan. An Cnhurried i·;c 11' 0 ( Coprriglrr. Columbia University Press ( 1967).
See J.P. Dawson. 'The Self-Sen in~ lntermeddler'. in Hanard Lall' Rniell' 87 (1974) 1409.
As Justice Benjamin Kaplan noted. 'if man has any "natural'" rights. not the least mu_st ~e a
right to imitate his fellows ... "[P]rogress" ... depends on generous indulgence of copymg · B.
Kaplan. supra. note 36. at 2.
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could have some bad effects for legitimacy, willingness to obey the law, and
general civility. Reaping without sowing is hardly something that deserves broad
condemnation.
Therefore, I will illustrate what I think to be the best form that an author's
claim of right can take. Oddly enough, in the end, I find that authors' rights
advocates should condemn the new extension. They should join the instrumentalists in opposing it.
There are many views of authors' rights. The most popular links authors' rights
to the natural rights of property, as explicated in John Locke's second treatise. 39
Current thinkers, including myself, are not the only ones who find Locke
congenial - so did the Framers. John Locke was one of the most influential of the
philosophers read by the group who wrote our Constitution - including the
Copyright and Patent Clause. 40
Locke's second treatise says that originally we all owned the earth in common.
He explains this common ownership by reference to God's gift and God's intent.
For secular readers of today, the explanation lies in a belief in equality that was
still questioned in Locke's time. In fact, fostering an increase in equality was
integral to Locke's main goa1: 41 he wrote in opposition to the divine right of
kings. 42 Locke sought to justify a right to government that serves the people's
interest by reference to this original common ownership of the earth. Therefore, he
posited that in a state of nature we would all be equally entitled to the fruits of the
earth, whether they are fish in the sea or nuts and apples in the forest.
Now, to understand how Locke's property theory fits with his theory of
government, we need to recall the arguments of Sir Robert Filmer, another
philosopher of the period. Filmer supported the divine right of kings. 43
Filmer belittled the notion of common ownership. He argued that if everybody
owned the earth the common, then no one person could ever take even a walnut
from a walnut tree, without getting the consent of everyone else. That would be an
insuperable barrier to ever creating private property. Therefore, Filmer concluded
that the only way for private property to come into being - this institution that his
contemporaries saw all around them and thought so beneficial - was to have a
king. A king does not have to create a consensus of the whole every time somebody
gets hungry and wants to eat a walnut. A king can declare who owns what.

39

For discussion of the John Locke's natural rights theories, and their application to copyright
law, see W.J. Gordon. 'Property Right in Self-Expression', in Yale Lmr Journal 102 (1993) 1533.
relying on John Locke. Tll'o Treatises a( Government (P. Laslett (ed.)), Cambridge University
Press (2nd ed .. 1967), 287-88 (based on the original 3rd ed. 1698. corrected by Locke) (book II).
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See W.J. Gordon, supra, note 39. at 1539.
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See ihid. at 1542.
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The work he was primarily aiming to refute was Filmer's Patriarcha. Sir Robert Filmer.
Patriarcha and Other Political Works, (P. Laslett (ed.)). Basil Blackwell (1949).
Jhid.
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Locke's response was that common ownership of property does not necessarily
give every co-owner a right to be consulted whenever it is used. Rather, all the coowners have a right not to be harmed by its use. Locke believed that if someone's
private use or consumption has not harmed strangers, the strangers' only interest
in challenging it would come from motives not worth respecting, such as
covetousness, envy, and laziness.
But if, by contrast, strangers are harmed by someone's taking a bite out of the
common property for private property, then they have a legitimate right to
complain. From this comes a fairly famous axiom of Locke's: The labourer owns
whatever from the common he has intermixed with his labour, so long as ·enough,
and as good', is left for everyone else. Locke reasoned that if enough and as good
is left, then there is no ground for complaint. 44
This seems reasonable. If many of us are on a desert trek and running out of
water, and one happens upon a small pool of fresh water, we would think that
person acts wrongfully if he tries to exclude all the rest of us, or if, after filling his
own water bottle. he uses the pool as a latrine so it becomes unsuitable for
drinking. But if all of us find springs or pools of fresh water sufficient for our
needs, we would not think any of us wrongful if we kept our own spring to
ourselves, and used it for any purpose we desired. That rightful exclusive use is the
key to what we call 'property' .45 Thus, the 'enough and as good' condition is
crucial to Locke's justification of a natural right of property.
Imagine another example: An individual spends the day climbing trees in the
forest to gather apples. By the end of the day she has a small heap of apples.
Imagine further that upon completing her work, there are just as many good
apples left on the trees for someone else to pick. Anyone who invests the same kind
of labour can obtain just as many apples of equivalent quality - there is 'enough
and as good' left. Then a stranger comes along and takes the heap of apples that
the labourer has already picked.
Unless the stranger has some physical disability that prevents him from picking
his own fruit, it is clear the stranger is acting that way solely to take advantage of
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See J. Locke. Second Treatise. chapter 5 at section 27. The proviso that 'enough. and as good'
be left for others constitutes an additional 'do no harm' principle. See also L.C. Becker.
Property Rights: Philosophic Fou11dario11s, Routledge & Kegan Paul (1977). Similarly. Locke's
argument regarding waste suggests he saw nothing wrongful in taking property from someone
to whom it had no value. J. Locke. SCl'ond Treatise. chapter 5 at section 37. If so. Locke would
seem to view a non-harmful taking as non-wrongful. at least in the state of nature.
Property includes more than a right of use. Typically it also includes. inter alia, a right to
alienate and to bequeath. See Honore. 'Ownership', in L.C. Becker & K. Kipnis (eds.).
Properry: Cases. Concepts. Critiques. Prentice Hall ( 1984). 78. at 85. For discussion of property
entitlements in the copyright context. see W.J. Gordon. supra, note 30. at 1343-.1469. However.
it is usually agreed that Locke's theory grounds a right of use and consumpt10n much more
securely than it docs other property entitlements. such as a right to alienate. The entitlement
probably most questionable in the Lockean scheme is the right to transmit by mhentance.
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the labourer's pains. If using the other gatherer's labour did not motivate him, he
would have picked his own apples, which would have been equally good. The
stranger is acting wrongfully to so favour his own interest over another's. He is
using the other's labour as a means toward his own ends, violating the very tenets
of equality. He is harming the labourer by taking her labour, which is now
inextricably tied to the apples that she gathered. Because he is acting wrongfully to
take the labourer's pile, she has a right to exclude him from using the apples. She
has a form of property in the apples.
Locke says the earth was given to us for the benefit of the industrious and
rational, not for the benefit of those who are covetous. 46 What does it mean to
covet in Lockean terms? I think it is something that we, in secular terms, can
understand. It means to want what someone else has created; to choose one's self
over the other who has invested his effort in it; to disregard that person's efforts
and take the thing to one's self. If you want to use deontological language, it is a
primary violation of the right of equal treatment.
The application of this theory to intellectual property is obvious. So obvious, in
fact, that Locke has sometimes been misdescribed as if he himself created an
explicit defence of intellectual property.47 But, though that was not part of his
project, applying Locke's property theory to the labour of the mind is intuitive and
appealing: A creator takes something out of the common heritage - language,
myth, artistic forms, and ideas. With this, she mixes something of her own:
intellectual labour, artistry, taste, and judgment. The result is an intangible - a
song, a story, a computer program - in which both common and individual
elements are mixed. If, in taking from the common heritage, she left 'enough and
as good' there for others to use, she would seem entitled to exclude strangers from
what she has made. Similarly, she would seem entitled to demand compensation as
a price for their using it. If so, she has a justifiable form of 'property'.
Thus, the theory suggests that, once the labourer has mixed her labour with the
common, she has a right to call on either God, other people in the community,
civil society, or the government to keep strangers from this new thing she has
made. That is her right. But for every right that a property owner has, there is a
corresponding duty on others. So what about the rest of us? Do we have nothing
but duties once the labourer has acted? Let me just try to make clear what the
rights and duties of the public are.
. We have, under this view of Locke's, no right to another's pains, except if we are
m great need. Aside from those extreme situations, strangers owe us no duties to
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· e that had as good left for his improvement. as was already taken up. needed not complain.
ought .not to meddle with what was already improved by another·s labour: if he did. it is plain
he desired the benefit of another's pains. which he had no right to, and not the ground which
God had given him m common', Second Trearise of' Gol'ern111e111, Chapter 5 at section 34.
See E.W. Ploman & LC. Hamilton, Copyright - fntelll'Ctual Properrr in the fn/{mnarion Age.
Routledge & Kegan Paul (1980), at 13.
.

124

Do WE

HAVE A RIGHT TO SPEAK WITH ANOTHER'S LANGUAGE')

improve our lot. This is a norm quite unlike that of the pure economic or utilitarian
perspective, which seems to say that all persons should be enlisted in creating the
greatest net social product. The Lockean approach says 'no' to such instrumentalism. The consuming public does not have a right to the biggest and best. The
public's right is preserved in its ability to make use of the common heritage. That
entitlement is enshrined in the 'enough and as good' principle, which prevents new
property from forming if the assertion of property rights would leave the public
worse off in its use of that heritage. The public also has a right to act toward the
created object in ways that do not take the creative person's labour.
I want to suggest that if you take the Lockean perspective seriously, you end up
not with an unlimited right, but rather, with a very limited one. The example of
American author Mark Twain will suggest that an unlimited right is an
impossibility if we are going to have a culture at all. Twain is sometimes referred
to as an advocate of extreme and perpetual copyright. But really, he could not
have been. After all, in writing A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, he
borrowed from the many bards who had told King Arthur's tales in prior years. If
Twain was going to be able to use images and stories that he learned through
somebody else's efforts, and if he felt rightful in doing so, he must have had a
conception of boundaries on those prior writers' initial rights. There are many
such possible boundaries - perhaps ownership could subsist in expression and not
ideas, or perhaps there could be some type of time limit on the ownership of
expressions. But if there is to be more than one generation of author, some
limitations on the claims of the initial generation are mandatory.
I suggest a conclusion that I defend at more length elsewhere: that our current
copyright law gives authors more than they would get under Lockean natural
rights. Sometimes the assertion of United States copyright law leaves the public
worse off than it otherwise would have been in its ability to use the pre-existing
heritage, and the law sometimes gives property rights far broader than are justified
by the labourer's initial investment. Current copyright law gives more than a
thoughtful authors' rights framework would justify.
It seems to me that there are at least three ways of handling that conclusion.
First, if, in fact. current copyright law gives authors more than they would
justifiably receive under natural rights, one response might be to amend the
natural rights framework, or to junk it. A second response might be to amend
copyright law, or junk that. A third response might be to investigate whether
current copyright law gives back to the public - either in kind or in different form
- benefits to compensate it for the losses it inflicts.
The latter is my favoured option. I argue that copyright law is justifiable under
a natural rights framework if it takes from the public only fungible, commensurable losses for which the law fully compensates in other ways. And I think that US
copyright law - at least until recently - did a fairly good job of providing such
compensation, and should do so. In short, the authors' rights perspective ends up
saying that the copyright statute must, to some extent, serve the public interest,
which includes the interest of future creators, as well as the public.
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This does not collapse the authors' rights and instrumentalist views together.
For example, an author may deserve property rights, even if those rights do not
lead to maximizing the sum of value in the world. All that is necessary under the
Lockean approach is for the creative labourer to satisfy the ·enough and as good'
proviso; if she does, then she has a legitimate property claim to exclude other
people from taking the labour she has invested. Yet, the nature of the proviso and
the limited nature of the claim do involve our law in some give-and-take. For
purposes of practical administration and otherwise, we grant copyrights a scope
far beyond these limits. Something must be paid for the erosion of the public's
rights.
The easiest and least costly way to serve that goal - to leave the individual
creator unharmed and give benefit to the public - is to cut off ownership at a
limited term, particularly when the cut-off occurs after the author's death.
Anything beyond the author's lifetime stretches the notion of protected the
labouring author herself - and that protection is the Lockean focus. Although no
particular specification is possible, I think this is a perspective that is more on the
Eldred side in opposing the Bono extension than it is on Professor Miller's side in
favouring it.
That, then, is the structure of my argument: Under an authors' rights view, the
creative person's investment of labour should be protected. so long as she leaves
'enough and as good'. Our law gives creative persons - and their employers and
assigns - much more than that. It protects more than the investment of labour,
and gives rights even where 'enough and as good' may not be left. The public's
rights are thus eroded. As a result, the law owes something to the public. One of
the best ways to partly pay this debt is to limit the copyright term.
What remains to be specified are some of the ways in which our current law
gives more scope to copyright than the Lockean view would justify. Let me then
end by giving you three examples of things that we do protect by copyright, which
I do not think a Lockean would protect.
The first such candidate is the extreme right over derivative works. Right now,
a copyright owner can control any substantial use of his or her authorship, even if
the second person is a creative individual who is doing something with the work
that the original author never in a million years could have done themselves. In
that case, a derivative work author causes the creator no harm at all, interferes in
no way with the creator's initial plans, and may even give the creator new publicity
and, therefore, new funds. There is no taking of the initial investment or
mterference with the creative person's foreseeable range of goals. Nevertheless,
current copyright law imposes liability on this person who - unlike the stranger
who s~ole the ~pples - is causing no harm. There may be practical reasons for such
a choice, but it nevertheless goes much further than a Lockean analysis would
justify.
Second, i~ is not clear that natural law would go any further than giving
pr_operty dunng the life of the author itself. Even the right of transfer during life
might be questioned.
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For a third set of examples, I will refer back to my imagined piece of music
that was created in 1931. Recall the new composer who wants to use it one
hundred years later to comment on a period of economic tumult in her own life.
She really has no substitute for the associations the music brings. She is not like
the covetous stranger who uses the fruit of another's labour simply to save
himself effort. She has a goal that can be defined independently from the saving
of effort. If so, this user of the 1931 song is outside the class of persons whom
Locke wished to restrain. In addition. her derivative work may be outside of the
class of activities that would constitute an erosion of the original composer's
investment.
The same may be true of a person who wants to collect twentieth-century songs
for a history volume. Furthermore, enforcing copyright against this music
historian might violate the proviso of leaving 'enough, and as good'. A historian in
the state of nature had a freedom that copyright law will not allow to today's
historian.
Describing our surroundings through art is one of the ways we navigate that
described world. In virtually any view of human nature, making our own art or
having access to others' art is essential for emotional and cognitive flourishing.
So, when a historian uses others' images or sounds not simply to save himself
labour, but because he and his audience need to understand the past to better
navigate the present, he is not violating the tenets of equality. He is not like
Locke's covetous stranger. If we borrow another's image, not to use it for its
original purpose, but rather, because we need to describe our world accurately,
the Lockean approach would not forbid us. Yet copyright today does so forbid
us.
Moreover, in the state of nature. we could create art that described our
surroundings. But when we need to describe the world around us today, we cannot
be accurate if all we describe is natural woods and water. Rather, most of us
seeking to represent our environment would describe created architecture,
manmade sounds, and cultural symbols. If we are to have 'enough, and as good',
we must continue to have the freedom to use our surroundings in our own art. Yet
the copyright courts forbid such uses.
There are many plausible reasons why copyright Jaw draws the lines here. Most
notably, if the uses I describe were permitted, it could be administratively quite
difficult to distinguish good-faith users from the commercially-motivated covetous
strangers, who might disguise their pure parasitism under a cloak of independent
artistic goals. Similarly, if unforeseen derivative uses were free of copyright
restraint, determining foreseeability could embroil the courts in complex
investigations into inherently uncertain counter-factuals. But though practical
reasons may explain the grant of copyright in ways that erodes the public's
entitlement, that erosion still requires compensation. A reasonably short copyright
term is one way to make such repayment.
.
A short copyright term is also appropriate in Lockean terms. Labour is
a purposive notion; random activity is not 'labour', for 'labour' is goal
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directed. 48 The core of the Lockean prohibition is the norm that the stranger
should not harmfully interfere with goals the labourer's efforts seek to further. 49 It
is hard to imagine that copying a work seventy years after death - a copy that may
be made a century or more after the work was created - would interfere with the
goals of the author seventy or more years before. In some real way, the use of the
work in the far distant future is unforeseeable. We should follow the logic of the
common law; as duties do not extend to the unforeseeable, neither should rights.
The tort analogy is instructive from the economic perspective as well. Both
copyright law and personal injury law seek to affect behaviour by 'internalizing
externalities'. That is, the legal doctrines seek to make decision-makers feel some
of the effects to which their decisions and behaviours give rise. Copyright law
allows people to capture benefits they generate. In copyright law, 'carrots' are
given to plaintiffs to make them produce more creative works. In tort law, 'sticks'
are imposed on defendants to make them engage less in destructive behaviour. In
this way, torts and copyright mirror each other, operating in ways that are parallel
but reversed.
There exists a constitutionally-mandated command that copyrights can only
last for limited times. In two hundred years, all of today's copyrights will have
expired. That is, an heir of a copyright owner who sues for non-consensual
copying two hundred years from now will lose. Why? The logic is the same as in
the tort case of no foreseeability. Imposing a duty on a copyist to pay royalties a
hundred years after a book or movie is created will have no impact on an author's
willingness to work hard today. Given discount rates and the difficulties of
predicting that far in the future, the expectation of current benefit from such a fardistant right is minuscule, virtually unforeseeable. To impose liability would be to
raise the price of books above the physical cost of manufacturing and distributing
them for no incentive payoff. This not only wastes administrative costs (as
imposing liability for unforeseeable harms also would do), but also imposes a
deadweight loss on society. So plaintiff loses.
In the law of personal injury, a defendant need not pay for a harm
unforeseeably (and thus not proximately) caused. This rule makes sense because,
if t_his were not the rule, the court would be expending its resources to make the
defendant pay when the obligation would have no incentive effect. In the law of
copyright, copyright terms expire. If that were not the rule and copyrights were
perpetual, copyright law would make defendants pay at times so far distant that
the prospect of such payment would not add anything to the original author's
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incentives to create new works, but would decrease the dissemination of
information.

V.

Conclusion

Only copyright's limiting doctrines make copyright tolerable. This is equally true
from the perspective of free speech, public welfare, or the autonomy and natural
rights claims of downstream authors. Copyright's limits are the modes through
which the conflicting demands of the various affected participants can be
reconciled. Neither an authors' rights perspective nor an instrumentalist publicwelfare perspective supports the long copyright term created by the CTEA.
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